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Abstract
This paper surveys 36 broad-based capital injection (BBCI) programs and attempts to
identify some best (and worst) practices. We argue that it is crucial to distinguish between
programs implemented during acute (“panic”) and chronic (“debt overhang”) phases of a
crisis, where the goals of program design should be different. In an acute phase, programs
should be designed to influence the behavior of bank counterparties, while in chronic phases,
the focus should be on bank behavior itself. With this framing, we identify seven themes to
guide program design, and provide many illustrative examples for the policymaker’s tool kit.
Keywords: broad-based capital injection, equity injection, financial crisis interventions,
recapitalization
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Introductory Note: This survey is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers
seeking to establish a broad-based capital injection (BBCI) program. It is based on insights
derived from case studies of 36 specific BBCI programs the Yale Program on Financial
Stability has completed and from the existing literature on the topic. While this survey can
help inform a decision about whether or not to establish a BBCI program, our main purpose
to assist policymakers who have already made that decision in designing the most effective
program possible. In analyzing the programs that are the focus of this survey, we used a
color-coded system to highlight certain particularly noteworthy design features. Our colorcoding system is as follows:
Color
BLUE – INTERESTING

Meaning
A design feature that is interesting and that
policymakers may want to consider. Typically,
this determination is based on the observation
that the design feature involves a unique and
potentially promising way of addressing a
challenge common to this type of program that
may not be obvious. Less commonly, there will
be empirical evidence or a widely held
consensus that the design feature was effective
in this context, in which case we will describe
that evidence or consensus.
A design feature that policymakers should
exercise caution in considering. Typically, this
determination is based on the observation that
the designers of the feature later made
significant changes to the feature with the
intention of improving the functioning of the
program. Less commonly, there will be
empirical evidence or a widely held consensus
that the design feature was ineffective in this
context, in which case we will describe that
evidence or consensus.

YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED

This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not
highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that it
will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is
not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or
will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide
readers toward certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth
considering or (2) require caution.

Introduction
Financial crises occur when the banking system is undercapitalized. For government
authorities, the most direct way to fix an undercapitalization problem is by simply injecting
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new capital—the taxpayers effectively become investors in the banking system. Indeed, this
direct approach is common throughout history, comprising 285 of the 1,886 total
interventions in the Metrick and Schmelzing (2021) database. Of that total, 106 of these
programs are classified as “broad-based,” with eligibility for many qualifying institutions.
The database also shows that the frequency of such programs has been increasing over time,
especially in wealthy countries. This paper surveys 36 such broad-based capital-injection
(BBCI) programs and attempts to identify some best (and worst) practices.
Financial crises are messy affairs, and no two are the same. Furthermore, the institutional
background and political context vary significantly across crises, and it is not realistic to
expect a fixed playbook to fit all cases. Despite this unavoidable morass, scholars have
consistently found evidence that capital injections can facilitate crisis recovery. Laeven and
Valencia (2018) find that bank recapitalization helps the growth of financially dependent
firms. Brei, Gambacorta, and von Peter (2013) study 14 major economies from 1995–2010
and find that a “critical” level of recapitalization allows banks to expand lending in a crisis.
In a broad comparative analysis of the efficacy of different types of interventions, Tong and
Wei (2020) analyze 198 policy actions for 16 countries during the Global Financial Crises
(GFC) and conclude that “recapitalization of banks appears particularly effective in
channeling the intervention effects from financial to nonfinancial sectors.”
This evidence of effectiveness supports the use of BBCIs as an important part of the crisisfighting toolbox. But how should one design such programs? Policymakers have many
consequential choices, ranging from straightforward term-sheet-level questions to issues of
strategy and implementation. The main body of this paper discusses 17 of these Key Design
Decisions, drawing lessons from the academic literature (which is sparse on specific design
recommendations) and from the 36 case studies.
The case-based approach used here cannot provide any statistically significant conclusions.
That is the nature of this beast. But the mass of past experience, including many creative
ideas and numerous missteps, should be absorbed by future designers of BBCIs. For those
designers in a particular hurry, the conclusion of this survey discusses seven themes that
emerge from our analysis. Many of these themes are tied to a key framing mechanism:
program goals differ between acute and chronic phases of a crisis. Most BBCIs will list
“increased bank lending” as a main goal of the program. Academic studies have reinforced
this goal, with the effect on lending the most typical measure of program success. This goal
is entirely appropriate during the chronic “debt overhang” phase of a crisis, when policy
should be designed to directly influence the behavior of the banks. But during an acute
“panic” phase of a crisis, an emphasis on bank lending is misplaced. In an ongoing or incipient
panic, policy must focus on the behavior of bank counterparties, not on the banks themselves.
It is the counterparties who are running, and if those runs are not mitigated, the later chronic
phase will be more difficult to repair. We make extensive use of this framing throughout the
paper.
Figure 1 lists the 36 cases covered in this survey, with these cases divided into “acute” and
“chronic” groups. In most cases, this categorization is obvious, as we see for example in the
acute-phase programs announced at the height of the GFC in October 2008, or the chronic-
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phase definition for all the capital injections in the later stages of the long Japanese financial
crisis. However, in other cases, this categorization is less clear due to market conditions
improving but recovery of market confidence still stalling.
Figure 1: Programs Covered in This Survey: Acute and Chronic Groups
Acute

Chronic

Austria FinStaG (GFC)
France SPPE (GFC)
Germany SoFFin (GFC)
Greece (GFC)
Hong Kong contingent bank capital facility
(GFC)*
Hungary recapitalization scheme (GFC)
Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (Asian
Financial Crisis)

Israel bank shares arrangement (1983)
Italy Tremonti bonds (GFC)
Korea KDIC (Asian Financial Crisis)

Colombia FOGAFÍN capital injection (1999 & 2001)
Denmark capital injections (GFC)
Finland (Nordic Crisis, 1992)
Hungary bank recapitalization (1993–94)
Japan Financial Functions Stabilization Act (February
1998)
Japan Prompt Recapitalization Act (August 1998)
Japan Provision of Subordinated Loans for Major Banks
(GFC, 2009)
Japan Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (2004–
21)
Korea Bank Recapitalization Fund (GFC)
Malaysia Danamodal (Asian Financial Crisis)
Nigeria AMCON (2010)

Mexico PROCAPTE (Peso Crisis, 1995)
Poland 1925 FPIK capitalization (1925)
Russia bank capital support program (2014)
Thailand CSF 1998 (Asian Financial Crisis)
UK bank recapitalisation scheme (GFC)
US RFC (1933)

Norway (Nordic Crisis, 1991)
Norway State Finance Fund (GFC)
Spain FROB (GFC)
Sweden Bank Support Authority (1993)
Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (2000)
US SCAP/CAP (GFC, 2009)

US CPP (GFC, 2008)

US CDCI (GFC, 2010)

Ireland recapitalization program (GFC)

* When Hong Kong announced this program, it was precautionary, and the capital levels of banks were well above 8%
and remaining so.

Source: Authors’ analysis.

We categorize the 2009 GFC programs in the US and Japan as chronic, as the details for all of
these were announced after short-term funding markets had considerably improved and
program goals had switched away from rescue and toward recovery. Similarly, most of the
programs from the Asian Financial Crises are classified as acute, with the exception of
Malaysia’s relatively late program.
As an illustration of the important distinction between acute- and chronic-phase programs,
consider two well-studied GFC programs in the US, the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) of
late 2008 and the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program/Capital Assistance Program
(SCAP/CAP) in early 2009. The CPP was announced and first implemented in October 2008,
during the most acute phase of the GFC and coincident with BBCI programs in many other
countries. This program had relatively simple terms, loose eligibility for participation, and
light restrictions on participant behavior. In contrast, the SCAP/CAP details were finalized
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after short-term funding markets had calmed considerably and included a novel stress test
and relatively complex rules around any necessary injections. While neither of these
program designs was perfect (as discussed in Key Design Decisions section), we believe that
on balance both should be labeled as a success. But if one were to have flipped the program
designs, we think that the outcomes would likely have been far worse.
The remaining sections of this paper go through the specific Key Design Decisions in detail.
We note at the outset of this analysis that most of these design decisions were made in real
time, often during the most acute phases of a crisis. In almost all cases, the legal background
for the programs was either new or untested, and many mistakes were made because of this
time pressure and novelty. A metatheme of this paper—and of much of the work of the Yale
Program on Financial Stability—is that program design could be significantly improved if
policymakers worked out some of these details in advance. In the best case, there would be
a flexible law passed during a quiet period that could be invoked in “emergencies” to enable
the most common designs.

Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: Was the BBCI program announced with different policy
interventions, or was it announced stand-alone? Were there any intervention
programs existing when the BBCI came into effect?
Some BBCI programs were announced on a stand-alone basis, but most were announced as
a part of a package of measures. In some instances, authorities had already provided
emergency liquidity, account or debt guarantees, or ad hoc capital injections before the BBCI
program became operational. Figure 2 lists different combinations of policy measures in
operation with BBCI programs.
In 13 of the 36 cases, recapitalization was combined with a government program to purchase
or guarantee nonperforming loans (NPLs) from those banks. In Spain, the purchase or
guarantee of NPLs came after the recapitalization was in progress. In Hungary, Israel, South
Korea, and Thailand, governments also enforced banking sector reform with the
recapitalization program. Studies of past capital injection programs during the Asian
Financial Crisis suggest that bank restructuring and impaired-asset purchases are both
complementary to recapitalization, since the goal of recapitalization is to restore and
reassure “sustainable cash-based profitability” (Enoch, Garcia, and Sundararajan 2001; Scott
2002). Brei et al. (2020) conclude that recapitalization is often ineffective without an NPL
strategy, and vice versa.
In 22 of the cases, recapitalization was combined with a comprehensive government
guarantee of bank liabilities. 15 cases combined with debt guarantees, 15 cases combined
with account guarantees and 8 cases had both. Some believe that the US CPP in 2008–09 did
not stabilize the financial system alone—only when it was combined with a debt guarantee
from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was the government able to calm financial
markets (Jester, Nason, and Norton 2020).

5

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

Figure 2: Other Policy Measures in Operation with BBCI Programs (Chronic Group Programs from Figure 1 Highlighted)
BBCI program
Austria FinStaG (GFC)
Colombia FOGAFÍN capital injection (1999 & 2001)
Denmark Capital Injections (GFC)
Finland (Nordic Crisis, 1992)
France SPPE (GFC)
Germany SoFFin (GFC)
Greece (GFC)
Hong Kong Contingent Bank Capital Facility (GFC)
Hungary Bank Recapitalization (1993–94)
Hungary Recapitalization Scheme (GFC)
Indonesia Bank Restructuring Plan (Asian Financial Crisis)
Ireland Recapitalization Program (GFC)
Israel Bank Shares Arrangement (1983)
Italy Tremonti bonds (GFC)
Japan Financial Functions Stabilization Act (February 1998)
Japan Prompt Recapitalization Act
(August 1998)
Japan Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (2004–21)
Japan Provision of Subordinated Loans for Major Banks (GFC, 2009)
Korea KDIC (Asian Financial Crisis)
Korea Bank Recapitalization Fund (GFC, 2008)
Malaysia Danamodal (Asian Financial Crisis)
Mexico PROCAPTE (Peso Crisis, 1995)
Nigeria AMCON (2010)
Norway (Nordic Crisis, 1991)
Norway State Finance Fund (GFC)
Poland 1925 FPIK capitalization (1925)
Russia Bank Capital Support Program (2014)
Spain FROB (GFC)
Sweden Bank Support Authority (1993)
Thailand CSF (Asian Financial Crisis)
Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (2000)
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme (GFC)
US RFC (1933)
US CPP (GFC, 2008)

Other programs*
AP, G (debt)
DR, R
G (already put in place before recap) (debt and account)
AP, G (debt)
G (debt) (refinancing assistance created by private banks supported by government
guarantee)
AP, G (debt)
G (debt), O (liquidity support via government bonds)
G (debt and account)
AP, O (debtor restructuring, financial sector reform)
G (debt)
AP, DR, R, G (debt and account)
G (debt)
O (temporary stock market closure, financial sector reform)
G (account), O (liquidity support)
AP, G (account), O (tax reduction)
AP, R, G (account)
N
O (stock purchase–market liquidity)
AP, DR, R, G (account), O (financial sector reform)
R, O (market liquidity)
AP, DR
AP, DR, R, G (debt and account)
AP
N
G (account), O (liquidity support, market liquidity)
N
N
(later added to include) AP, R, G (debt and account)
G (debt and account)
AP, DR, O (financial sector reform)
AP, G (account)
G (debt and account), O (market liquidity)
R, G (debt and account)
O (housing, auto, credit market relief), G (debt and account)

US SCAP/CAP (GFC, 2009)
O (market liquidity and consumer, small and medium enterprise (SME) lending)
US CDCI (GFC, 2010)
O (SME lending)
*AP=asset purchase and other measures to provide relief from nonperforming or legacy assets, DR= debt restructuring, R=resolution, G=guarantee (debt and/or account),
N=none, O=other (description).

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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There are several reasons why combinations with other interventions—and with guarantees
in particular—may be more effective than BBCI programs by themselves. First, it may simply
be that such guarantees are essentially available only to high-income countries (Laeven and
Valencia 2018). Under this explanation, we may simply be confounding the existence of the
combination with the resources of the country, where the latter is what matters.
A similar mechanism, working just through expectations, might be that a combination of
programs signals to counterparties that the government has many tools available and is
willing to use them if necessary. In this case, there would be actual efficacy advantages for
using a combination of programs, but it would require that the government’s signals be
credible. Such credibility may also vary with national income.
But a “real” benefit of combinations, independent of national income, is also plausible. Here,
we recognize that while capital injections are the most direct method to solve an
undercapitalization problem, BBCI programs require immediate payments to banks and are
thus both fiscally and politically expensive. A guarantee program, on the other hand, incurs
only contingent liabilities for the government, and the absence of immediate outlays can
make it politically more palatable. If marginal contributions to different types of programs
suffer from decreasing returns, it would be easy to construct simple models where the
government should optimally spread fiscal and political capital across a variety of programs.
2. Legal Authority: What was a legal basis that the authorities relied on? Was there a
need for new law, or could they rely on existing authority? For European Union
(EU) member countries, what extra European Commission (EC) approval did they
need?
In most jurisdictions, government authorities created a new regulatory framework for BBCI
programs. Out of 36 cases analyzed in this survey, only Japan and South Korea (both in GFC)
did not require additional legislation for the BBCI program. In Japan, the Bank of Japan (BOJ)
requested authorization from the minister of finance and prime minister to introduce the
BBCI framework to provide subordinated loans to banks. In general, the BOJ enjoys wide
discretion to perform any activity necessary for its mandate, provided it receives
authorization from the minister of finance and the prime minister. In this case, the BOJ
requested authorization to extend subordinated loans on the basis of maintaining stability
of the financial system.
In South Korea, authorities relied on the Bank of Korea’s (BOK’s) authority to provide
temporary credit to financial institutions in an emergency. The Financial Services
Commission, with statutory authority on financial policy and supervision, established the
Bank Recapitalization Fund (BRF) to administer and manage capital injections. The BOK
provided funding for the BRF. However, since it was prohibited under law from directly
funding the BRF, it instead provided credit to a state-owned development bank based on the
emergency authority, then this state bank passed the BOK funds through to the BRF.
The legal framework may (1) set up a new organization or authorize an existing government
entity to operate and manage the recapitalization, (2) appropriate existing funding or raise
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new funding for the program, (3) define the terms of any capital subscription, (4) provide
guidelines for any conditions, and (5) direct how the authorities will exit their holdings. Each
of these items is discussed in further detail in the appropriate Key Design Decision below.
Amid a fast-developing crisis, some governments intervene before they have a clear legal
authority to do so. For example, in Sweden’s BBCI, in 1991, the Ministry of Finance began
injecting capital on an ad hoc basis without a specific legal framework. It was only in
December 1992 that the Swedish parliament passed a bill creating the Bank Support
Authority.
For some countries, the international legal framework can also be binding. EU member states
needed the approval of the European Commission for BBCI programs during the GFC. Article
107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union prohibits State Aid, which is
defined as an advantage selectively provided by a national public authority that is likely to
affect trade between states and may distort competition.
Article 107(3)(b) of the treaty, however, provides an exception to the general prohibition if
the aid is in the common interest of EU countries or if it seeks to remedy a “serious
disturbance” in the economy of an EU country. During the GFC, such disturbances were clear.
On October 13, 2008, the EC issued guidance to member states on how they could support
financial markets without excessive distortion to competition (European Commission
2009b). The guidance allowed for recapitalization of financial institutions that were
fundamentally sound but might experience distress because of extreme conditions in
financial markets. Countries could use recapitalization to strengthen the capital base of the
financial institutions directly or to facilitate the injection of private capital, with the aim of
preventing negative systemic spillovers (European Commission 2008a).
Each case of State Aid required prior notification to the EC, and each member state had to
wait for the EC’s decision before putting the aid measures into effect. Acknowledging the
urgency of the situation, the EC promised a swift review process upon complete notification
and a decision within 24 hours and over a weekend, if necessary (European Commission
2008a). The EC subsequently published principles for designing specific features in
recapitalization programs, which we further discuss in the appropriate sections below
(European Commission 2009b).
It is worth noting that the EU's Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), adopted
post-GFC in 2014, allows countries to undertake precautionary recapitalizations of banks
that are solvent and not failing or likely to fail. Such measures are conditional on final
approval under EU State Aid rules.
3. Communications: How did the government communicate the goals of the
program? Were there any special communication issues?
This section highlights some communication practices in BBCI programs. In general, in
introducing and operating a BBCI program, authorities strive to quickly reinstall confidence
in the banks and the financial system. It is essential that the public maintain confidence in
the authorities themselves. Successful communications are clear about the goals of the
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program, send consistent messages, and portray the authorities as competent and decisive.
In particular, an acute-phase program should speak directly to bank counterparties and
emphasize the effect of additional capital on the safety of bank liabilities. In contrast, a
chronic-phase program should communicate with the banks themselves and emphasize the
need to use their capital to lend to households and businesses. The long-term public
perception of programs can be driven by expectations from these early communications, so
it is not helpful to talk about “increasing lending” if there is nothing in the program design to
incentivize that goal.
A poorly communicated recapitalization can make a bad situation worse. For example, a long
lag between the announcement and implementation of a program can erode market
confidence. Also, if the authorities fail to explain disparate treatments across banks, they may
risk the perception that they are bailing out those that are politically connected.
In Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis, public confidence in banks eligible for
recapitalization faltered due to inconsistent communication about the program from the
government. In December 1998, markets collapsed when President B.J. Habibie announced
that he was replacing the recapitalization program with forced mergers. The government
then changed course for a second time, restoring the recapitalization program, and the
parliament passed a budget for it in February 1999 (Lindgren et al. 2000, 63). However, two
days before the expected implementation of the plan in February 1999, the government
postponed it yet again on the grounds that there was a lack of political consensus around the
plans for several of the banks. The public reacted negatively to that news. Many believed that
decisions had been influenced by political favoritism (Enoch et al. 2001). When the
government finally implemented the program on March 13, 1999, it generally reaffirmed the
terms of its original commitment. Yet, even then, it created uncertainty about its intentions
by neglecting to “explicitly restate its earlier commitment to leave the day-to-day running of
the banks in the hands of the owners” (Lindgren et al. 2000, 64).
4. Governance and Administration: Did the government or the central bank take the
lead in establishing the BBCI program? Were any private parties involved for
consultation? Were there requirements to report to a legislative body? Were there
external or internal audits of the program’s operations?
In devising governance arrangements, authorities must pay attention to both the operational
efficiency of the program and to the public perception of its fairness. There are often many
reasonable ways to successfully achieve the first goal. For the second, designers must be
sensitive to the social and political climate. Is the public blaming specific actors for the crisis?
How significant are concerns about fairness or corruption if an existing agency is directly
administering the program? As with the communication challenges discussed above, there
are many ways to get this part wrong but no general strategy to get it right.
Typically, the fiscal authority has taken the lead in establishing and administering the
recapitalization of financial institutions. This is to be expected, as recapitalization entails
substantial fiscal costs. The central bank has taken the lead in a smaller number of cases. In
the Indonesian BBCI case of 1999, the new legislation on bank restructuring gave Bank

9

Journal of Financial Crises

Vol. 4 Iss. 1

Indonesia the purview to make temporary capital investments in banks, and based upon this
legal authority, the Ministry of Finance and Bank Indonesia issued a joint decree outlining
the recapitalization program. Similarly, in the German BBCI during the GFC, the Federal
Agency for Financial Market Stabilization, which managed the program, reported initially to
Bundesbank but was later assigned to the Ministry of Finance. In the Japanese BBCI case
during the GFC, called the Provision of Subordinated Loans for Major Japanese Banks, the
Bank of Japan obtained an exception from the minister of finance and the prime minister to
be the sole operator for recapitalizing banks with subordinated loans.
Even when the fiscal authority takes the lead, central banks and other supervisory and
regulatory agencies will assist in the operations, often with private sector experts. For
example, South Korea’s Bank Recapitalization Fund during the GFC was managed by a
committee consisting of nine members representing the bank supervisor, participating
banks, and institutional investors. Finland in the 1990s commissioned a working group of
officials and bankers to draft a public report proposing the design of the program. Malaysia’s
BBCI program in 1998 hired Goldman Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney as independent
advisers to gauge the overall health of the beneficiaries, to determine the required capital
amount, and to construct an operational infrastructure. Figure 3 lists the main operators of
our 36 BBCI programs, highlighting any newly created legal entities.
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Figure 3: Main Entity Responsible for BBCI Operations
Country

Crisis

Institution administrating BBCI

Austria

GFC

Special entity (FIMBAG)

Colombia

1999 & 2001

Special entity (FOGAFÍN)

Denmark

GFC

Government

Finland

Nordic Crisis 1990s

Government

France

GFC

Special entity (SPPE)

Germany

GFC

Special entity (SoFFin)

Greece

GFC

Government

Hong Kong

GFC

Hong Kong Monetary Authority

Hungary

1993–94

Government

Hungary

GFC

Government

Indonesia

Asian Financial Crisis
1990s

Bank Indonesia and Special Entity (IBRA)

Ireland

GFC

Government

Israel

1983

Government

Italy

GFC

Government

Japan

Asian Financial Crisis
1990s

Government

Japan

Asian Financial Crisis
1990s

Special entity (FRC, RCC)

Japan

2004–21

Government

Japan

GFC

Bank of Japan

Korea

Asian Financial Crisis
1990s

Special entity (KDIC)

Korea

GFC

Special entity (Bank Recapitalization Oversight Committee)

Malaysia

Asian Financial Crisis
1990s

Special entity (Danamodal)

Mexico

Peso Crisis 1990s

Special entity (FOBAPROA)

Nigeria

2010

Special entity (AMCON)

Norway

Nordic Crisis 1990s

Special entity (GBIF, SBIF)

Norway

GFC

Special entity (SFF)

Poland

1925

Special entity (FPIK)

Russia

2014

Special entity (DIA)

Spain

GFC

Special entity (FROB)

Sweden

Nordic Crisis 1990s

Special entity (BSA)

Thailand

Asian Financial Crisis
1990s

Special entity (Financial Restructuring Advising Committee)

Turkey

2000

Special entity (BRSA, SDIF)

UK

GFC

Special entity (UKFI)

US

Great Depression

Special entity (RFC)

US

GFC

Government (US Treasury)

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Some experts recommend that the entity operating and managing the BBCI program should
remain independent, either from supervisors or political forces, while remaining under the
purview of the government. Sweden’s Bank Support Authority (BSA), created in 1992 for the
purpose of recapitalizing banks, remained independent from the banks’ supervisors. A
commenter closely involved in the operations of the authority highlighted its independence,
stating that this was natural as the supervisors then did not have any experience in
recapitalizing banks. BSA reported the activities of participating institutions to the central
bank, the financial supervisory authority, and the National Debt Office. In Norway’s BBCI
program, the parliament created two funds with their own boards to handle the acquired
shares at arm’s length from the government. The purpose of this setup was to prevent the
political authorities from micromanaging the banks (Bergo 2003).
In most cases, the recapitalization operation has been subject to oversight and external audit.
In France, Ernst & Young performed external audits for the Société de prise de participation
de l’État (SPPE) financial statements. In Sweden, the BSA board was subject to audit by the
National Audit Office, as any other government entities would be. In the US, Congress created
new oversight committees to keep track of the capital injection programs during the GFC.
The Financial Stability Oversight Board, chaired by the chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board, oversaw the activities of CAP and CPP in the US; the Senate’s Congressional Oversight
Panel and a special inspector general conducted independent reviews. These forms of
external review can make the day-to-day operation of the program more burdensome but
can be useful to improve both the appearance and reality of fair treatment.
In the case of Japan’s recapitalization in 1998 under the Prompt Recapitalization Act,
governance issues in the independent oversight commission caused further uncertainty in
the market. While the first chair of the committee attempted to enforce stricter behavioral
terms for banks receiving capital injections, he was removed from the position after less than
a year and was replaced by a less-resolute chairman by the prime minister. The changes in
leadership caused volatility in the Japanese market, with shareholders unsure of future
underwriting terms. As the committee became more banker-friendly under successive
chairs, efforts to restructure Japanese banks faltered (Spindle and Dvorak 2000).
5. Size: What was the announced size of the total BBCI program? Did changing
circumstances lead the authorities to increase it?
Legislative bodies typically determine the total amount of funds available for
recapitalization, whether through taxpayer appropriation or government-bond issuance
(see Key Design Decision No. 7, Source of Funding). The size of the program may be based on
a rough estimate of the capital shortfall in the financial sector or simply an expression of
political feasibility. Decisions on the overall size of the program may also be influenced by
whether the crisis is in an acute or chronic phase. In an acute phase, policymakers may focus
on deploying a larger and wider-scale capital injection while facing less political resistance
due to the urgency of the situation. In a chronic phase, policymakers are likely to conduct
more detailed analysis to determine the size of the program. Ultimately, however, the overall
size of the program is constrained by fiscal space and political realities.
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In five of the cases we reviewed, the authorities increased the initially announced size of the
program, determining that the banking sector remained fragile after depleting the initially
allocated amount. In each of these cases, we label the change with the yellow caution flag.
If a recapitalization is too small and banks remain unable to meet capital requirements, not
only will the intervention have limited benefits, but there may also be costs. Banks that
remain undercapitalized may be more likely to continue lending to zombie firms rather than
take needed charge-offs (Giannetti and Simonov 2013). They may also seek to achieve capital
ratio targets by simply reducing their assets (the denominator of the ratio), or “shrinking to
health,” which doesn’t help them build capital (the numerator) or incentivize them to resume
lending (Mariathasan and Merrouche 2012). A study analyzing three capital injection
programs in Japan in 1998, 1999, and 2004 suggests that the size of capital injections and
banks’ ex-post ability to meet capital requirements are crucial determinants in the
effectiveness of recapitalization. The Japanese BBCI program in 1998 under the Financial
Functions Stabilization Act (FFSA) unilaterally offered JPY100 billion (less than USD1 billion)
to each of the city banks; considering the real capital needs of the banks, this amount proved
to be too small (Montgomery and Shimizutani 2009). New legislation establishing the 1999
program increased the size.
The Irish recapitalization program during the GFC appropriated a small amount initially and
then continuously increased the program’s size, which was consistent with the EC guidance
but created public uncertainty about banks’ financial positions and reduced confidence in
the official management of the problem (Baudino, Murphy, and Svoronos 2020; European
Commission 2008a).
Of course, it is difficult to determine how much capital banks will need during the acute stage
of a crisis, when the value of tradable assets and the likelihood of repayment on outstanding
credits are uncertain. During the chronic phase, governments have more time and data for
analysis. The US stress test in 2009 was a particularly rigorous example of analysis in the
chronic phase of a crisis. Formal estimates of capital needs may be based on capital ratio
targets in existing national regulations, international standards, or new targets developed in
response to the market stress. Malaysia’s central bank in 1998 conducted an industry-wide
stress test to determine the size of a BBCI program that would keep the risk-weighted capital
ratio across the banking industry above 9%. Similarly, Denmark’s central bank in the GFC
conducted a stress test based on three scenarios 6 for the 15 largest Danish banks to
determine the size of the program. The central bank expected the program would be large
enough to allow all eligible institutions in Denmark to achieve a 12% Tier 1 capital ratio, the
In the first scenario, the financial crisis would lead to a deep international recession, entailing lower demand
for Danish products; central banks worldwide would adopt a more expansionary monetary policy stance, and
interest rates would fall. In the second scenario, the financial crisis would prompt the Danish banks to
significantly reduce their lending. The third scenario was a combination of the first two scenarios, in which a
deep international recession would coincide with a credit crunch in Denmark and cause a historic decline in
economic activity. The stress test accounted for the fact that banks could not pay dividends for two years due
to the state guarantee issued in October 2008, and assumed that banks would contribute to the guarantee
scheme. The stress test modeled the pressure on bank earnings and capital adequacy that would result from
these scenarios.
6
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level the central bank decided was enough to increase banks’ ability to raise private capital
and support the economy.
In many cases, the size of the program was ultimately constrained by the public resources
available. When US officials described the CAP as an unlimited capital backstop in 2009, they
meant simply that they believed the roughly USD300 billion in available funds would be
sufficient to meet any potential needs (Clark, Kabaker, and Sachs 2020, 270). The size of the
Polish program in 1925 was constrained by limited fiscal space; for that reason, the program
prioritized larger banks.
Ireland’s recapitalization during the GFC ultimately ran into fiscal constraints (Honohan
2012, 5, 10–11). The government’s support of the country’s largest banks, which included a
blanket guarantee on bank liabilities, shifted the focal point of the crisis from the soundness
of banks to the soundness of the government itself. The financial precariousness of the banks
and the sovereign formed a vicious cycle (Bayoumi 2017, 208; Eichengreen 2014, 356–57).
6. Timing: Was the program timely?
Homar and van Wijnbergen (2017) find that recapitalizing banks early can shorten the
expected duration of a crisis-related recession by two years. In particular, they find that
timely action in the acute phase of a financial crisis can stem further erosion of banks’ capital
and lead to a faster recovery and limit damage to the economy. In contrast, Mariathasan and
Merrouche (2012) conclude that timing did not play any “statistically significant role” in a
study of recapitalizations’ effects on bank lending in 15 OECD (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development) countries.
As noted in Key Design Decision No. 3, Communications, delays in launching BBCI programs
can contribute to market confusion and allow banks’ liquidity to deteriorate further. South
Korea’s National Assembly Budget Office criticized the country’s Bank Recapitalization Fund
in the GFC for the delay in operations. By the time the voluntary program was in operation,
most banks had raised Tier 1 capital from the private market. The market then viewed banks
that participated in the program as weaker because they had been unable to raise funds from
private investors. Conversely, the Malaysian central bank argued that the timely
establishment of its BBCI program in 1998 contributed to the success of the program in
resolving banking sector problems and kept the cost of recapitalization low (Bank Negara
Malaysia 2004).
Political factors can create delays. South Korea’s 1998 program required an additional round
after the initially approved amount was depleted. By early 1999, the Korean government
recognized the need to raise more public funds to head off any additional unforeseen
complications. Lawmakers convened to discuss the second round of capital injections, but
the discussion paused and did not pick up until after the national election for lawmakers in
April 2000. The government did not declare the second round of funds until mid-2000. Some
scholars suggest that lawmakers had sought to avoid political backlash before the election,
and that they waited until financial markets became sufficiently turbulent before they
conceded that banks would require additional public funds (Lim and Hahm 2004, 19).
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International political factors can accelerate programs. For example, France accelerated the
announcement of SPPE after the Netherlands announced that it was injecting capital into
ING, a large Dutch bank. The US announced the CPP shortly after the UK announced its BBCI
program. Figure 4 lists the timeline for US and European BBCI programs during the GFC,
showing a cluster of announcements.
Figure 4: Announcement of BBCI Programs in US and EU Member States during the
Global Financial Crisis
BBCI program

Announcement date

UK (2008)
Italy (2008)
Germany (2008)
US (2008, CPP)
Greece (2008)
France (2008)
Austria (2008)
Hungary (2008)
Ireland (2008)
Denmark (2009)
Norway (2009)
US (2009, SCAP and CAP)
Spain (2009)
US (2010, CDCI)

October 8, 2008
October 9, 2008
October 12, 2008
October 14, 2008
October 15, 2008
October 20, 2008
October 26, 2008
November 6, 2008
December 14, 2008
February 3, 2009
February 8, 2009
February 10, 2009
June 27, 2009
February 3, 2010

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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7. Source of Funding: Where does the funding come from? Are the authorities
providing cash or bonds in exchange for the capital? Are there any private funds
involved? What measures do authorities take to protect the provided funds and
allow them to recoup their investments?
Some funding sources can prove controversial. In the case of the Irish BBCI in the GFC, the
minister of finance used the National Pension Reserve Fund to recapitalize the banks.
However, before this pension fund could be used for this purpose, the National Pension
Reserve Fund Act had to be amended; this took about three months after the initial
announcement of the recapitalization plan. The minister of finance raised EUR3 billion by
pulling forward and redirecting government funding of the pension fund and EUR4 billion
by liquidating existing assets in the fund, mostly cash reserves and government bonds. In a
subsequent ad hoc capital injection, when the government considered it unlikely that it
would recover funds, the Exchequer was used instead of the pension fund (Houses of the
Oireachtas 2016). However, the fiscal space was ultimately revealed to be limited as the Irish
government lost reasonable access to the bond market.
Some authorities obtained funding from the private sector. In Sweden (Nordic Crisis) and
Hungary (GFC), operational costs were partially funded through mandatory fees paid by the
participating financial institutions. In Indonesia, current shareholders were offered
warrants to purchase additional shares as an incentive to participate. Participating
shareholders also received Certificates of Entitlement, a tradable instrument on the capital
market entitling the holder to proceeds of collections and sales of assets transferred to the
recapitalizing authority over a specified period. We find this to be an interesting design
feature with many unexplored mechanics. By varying the terms of such offers, authorities
can create strong incentives for current shareholders to invest new capital, with the holdouts
effectively subsidizing the participants.
In Thailand, to incentivize private investor participation in the Tier 1 capital injection, the
government issued and offered three-year covered warrants on the preferred shares of
banks to participating investors, enabling them to purchase the government’s shares at the
original purchase price plus carrying costs (Santiprabhob 2003).
The government may contribute cash or bonds, either tradable or nontradable. Prior to the
GFC, bonds were a common source of payment by the government. However, during and
since the GFC, this has become less prevalent. Russia, Nigeria, and Turkey are the only
countries that have used government bonds in recent years. Russia paid government bonds
in its 2014 program in response to international sanctions, Nigeria’s AMCON in 2010 paid
banks in zero-coupon bonds guaranteed by the government, and Turkey’s Saving Deposit
Insurance Fund (SDIF) in 2000 paid the banks in treasury securities with floating rates
linked to borrowing costs and foreign exchange–linked bonds.
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Figure 5: Source of Funding for Capital Injection
BBCI program
Funding source*
Austria FinStaG (GFC)
NAP
Colombia: FOGAFÍN capital injection (1999 & 2001)
GB, O (deposit insurance fund)
Denmark Capital Injections (GFC)
E-CB
Finland (Nordic Crisis, 1992)
NAP
France SPPE (GFC)
GB
Germany SoFFin (GFC)
E-FM
Greece (GFC)
GB, IFI, F
Hong Kong (GFC)
E-O (foreign exchange fund)
Hungary Bank Recapitalization (1993–94)
GB, IFI
Hungary Recapitalization Scheme (GFC)
IFI (IMF, ECB)
Indonesia Bank Restructuring Plan of 1999 (Asian Financial Crisis)
GB
Ireland Recapitalization Program (GFC)
E-O (National Pension Reserve Fund)
Israel Bank Shares Arrangement (1983)
GB
Italy Tremonti bonds (GFC)
GB
Japan Financial Functions Stabilization Act (February 1998)
GB
Japan Prompt Recapitalization Act (August 1998)
GB
Japan Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (2004–21)
E-CB, O (Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan)
Japan Provision of Subordinated Loans for Major Banks (GFC, 2009)
E-CB
Korea KDIC (Asian Financial Crisis, 1997)
GB
Korea Bank Recapitalization Fund (GFC, 2008)
GB, NAP
Malaysia Danamodal (Asian Financial Crisis, 1998)
GB
Mexico PROCAPTE (Peso Crisis, 1995)
GB, IFI, F
Nigeria AMCON (2010)
GB
Norway (Nordic Crisis, 1991)
NAP
Norway (GFC)
NAP
Poland 1925 FPIK capitalization (1925)
F, O (seigniorage)
Russia Bank Capital Support Program (2014)
GB
Spain FROB (GFC)
NAP, O (Deposit Guarantee Funds)
Sweden Bank Support Authority (1993)
NAP, O
Thailand CSF (Asian Financial Crisis, 1998)
GB
Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (2000)
E-FM
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme (GFC)
GB
US RFC (1933)
GB
US CPP (GFC, 2008)
NAP
US SCAP/CAP (GFC, 2009)
NAP
US CDCI (GFC, 2010)
NAP
*E=existing, FM=finance ministry, CB=central bank, GB=newly issued government bonds, NAP=newly appropriated government funds, IFI=loans
from international institutions, F=loans from foreign country, O=Others
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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8. Eligible Institutions: Which institutions are eligible for assistance? Only banks?
Only domestic? Only potentially viable ones? Under what conditions do
governments make participation mandatory?
Types of Financial Institution
Generally, commercial banks and other depository institutions, such as savings banks and
credit unions, are eligible for assistance in BBCI programs. However, recapitalization may
also be extended to other financial institutions, depending on their roles in the economy.
Most programs we surveyed, except those in Japan (1998) and Spain (GFC), were limited to
domestic financial institutions. In the case of Japan, foreign banks were eligible but did not
participate. In Spain, financial holding companies based in other European Union member
states were eligible under some conditions. Figure 6 lists eligible institutions for BBCI
programs in our database. The figure shows that most acute-phase programs focus on
traditional banks, with broader eligibility more common in chronic-phase programs.
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Figure 6: Eligible Types of Institution ((Chronic Group Programs from Figure 1 Highlighted))
BBCI program
Austria FinStaG (GFC)
Colombia: FOGAFÍN capital injection (1999 & 2001)
Denmark Capital Injections (GFC)
Finland (Nordic Crisis, 1992)
France SPPE (GFC)
Germany SoFFin (GFC)
Greece (GFC)
Hong Kong (GFC)
Hungary Bank Recapitalization (1993-94)
Hungary Recapitalization Scheme (GFC)
Indonesia Bank Restructuring Plan of 1999 (Asian Financial Crisis)
Ireland Recapitalization Program (GFC)
Israel Bank Shares Arrangement (1983)
Italy Tremonti bonds (GFC)
Japan Financial Functions Stabilization Act
(February 1998)
Japan Prompt Recapitalization Act (August 1998)
Japan Act on Strengthening Financial Functions (2004–21)
Japan Provision of Subordinated Loans for Major Banks (GFC, 2009)
Korea KDIC (Asian Financial Crisis, 1997)
Korea Bank Recapitalization Fund (GFC, 2008)
Malaysia Danamodal (Asian Financial Crisis, 1998)
Mexico PROCAPTE (Peso Crisis, 1995)
Nigeria AMCON (2010)
Norway (Nordic Crisis, 1991)
Norway State Finance Fund (GFC)
Poland 1925 FPIK capitalization (1925)
Russia Bank Capital Support Program (2014)
Spain FROB (GFC)
Sweden Bank Support Authority (1993)
Thailand CSF (Asian Financial Crisis, 1998)
Turkey Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (2000)
UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme (GFC)
US RFC (1933)
US CPP (GFC, 2008)
US SCAP/CAP (GFC, 2009)
US CDCI (GFC, 2010)

Eligible institutions—only banks? If not, what other institutions? (Y/N)
Y
N (later extended to credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending)
Y
Y
N (all credit institutions)
N (insurance companies and pension funds)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N (all domestic/foreign banks, credit cooperatives, credit unions, and cooperatives—a
type of nonbank financial institutions)
N (three nonbanks listed explicitly in the law)
Y
Y
Y
Y
N (finance companies)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N (credit institutions including investment companies, etc.)
N (credit institutions owned by banks, government-affiliated credit institution)
N (finance and securities companies)
Y
Y
N (insurance companies, mortgage loan companies, national mortgage association)
N (S-corporations, mutual banks)
Y
N (credit unions, community development financial institutions)

Source: Authors’ analysis.
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Triage for Solvency/Viability
Most jurisdictions use solvency or viability tests as a condition of participation. For this
purpose, solvency tests can be based on some combination of regulatory and market
measures, both of which may be unreliable in the midst of a crisis. “Viability” is an even looser
concept, combining notions of solvency with a judgment about the potential for the bank
business to be sustainable long-term. Detailed triage may not be feasible in the acute phase
of a crisis, leading some countries to offer wider availability. This can be both necessary and
expedient. For example, Finland in 1992, suffering the deepest recession among the three
Nordic countries, offered recapitalization to banks regardless of their solvency. The US CPP,
during the acute phase of the Global Financial Crisis, broadly offered to purchase preferred
shares in banks of all sizes on a voluntary basis in late 2008. Regulators reviewed banks’
applications for CPP funds and approved banks that met simple criteria based on
supervisory ratings and financial ratios. Later, during a more chronic phase of the crisis in
early 2009, the US innovated the use of scenario-based stress testing to identify the capital
needs of systemically important banks in the US CAP. Triaging to identify banks that still
needed capital in the chronic phase came after the initial BBCI programs in the acute phase.
(Claessens et al. 2014)
Some pre-GFC cases demonstrate the danger of attempting too much triage during the acute
phase. The Thai program attracted some criticism for disproportionately focusing on
identifying potentially viable institutions. Initially, the Thai government and subsequently
the Thai central bank attempted to identify solvent and insolvent institutions. However,
Santiprabhob (2003) comments that this careful exercise meant that authorities paid too
little attention to asset deterioration and nonperforming loan restructuring. Similarly, in
Indonesia, triage delayed the operation of the BBCI program, where the government
announced a blanket guarantee in January 1998, began examinations in August 1998, but
did not implement recapitalizations until March 1999.
Triage is more feasible in the chronic phase. Here, policymakers can carefully assess
individual financial institutions, both to avoid wasting funds on nonviable banks and to make
sure that the injections are correctly sized for the viable ones. Disregarding an institution’s
needs can easily result in an ineffective recapitalization. Japan’s program under the FFSA in
1998 injected JPY100 billion into every city bank to avoid immediately revealing the
weakness of any one bank through the assisted amount (Montgomery and Shimizutani
2009). No attempt was made to discern whether this amount would be enough to
recapitalize each bank, and the amount was set unrelated to risk profile or level of
undercapitalization (Allen, Chakraborty, and Watanabe 2009). The government determined
the JPY100 billion figure because that was the most the government could get the Bank of
Tokyo Mitsubishi, the healthiest bank at that time, to accept (Montgomery and Shimizutani
2009). It proved insufficient to properly recapitalize the other major banks, which had
greater capital needs than the Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi.

20

Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs

Rhee et al.

Authorities sometimes use external experts to assist in the viability assessment. Sweden’s
BBCI program, announced in 1992, hired international consultants to analyze the banks’
credit portfolios and future viability before deciding to perform capital injections (Englund
2015). Similarly, Malaysia’s BBCI program in 1998 hired two US investment banks, Goldman
Sachs and Salomon Smith Barney, to determine the viability of banks and identify those very
likely to experience solvency issues by conducting comprehensive individual assessments
and industry-wide stress tests.
The data and methodology of stress testing have advanced significantly since the GFC, which
means that crisis triage techniques used in the past may be outdated. Some central banks
may now have the data and skills to perform a credible stress test in the short timeframe
required during the acute phase of a crisis. But a timeless lesson is that, in the acute stage,
capital injections will not achieve their goal of calming bank counterparties if the size and
features of the program are based on a non-credible test.
Mandatory Participation
Participation was voluntary in most of the programs that we studied. Exceptions included
Hungary (1993–94) and Korea (Asian Financial Crisis). Mexico’s PROCAPTE made the
participation voluntary for banks with capital adequacy ratios of 8% or above; for banks
below that level, the authorities could either mandate recapitalization or suspend their
banking charter.
In the cases of the US CAP and Malaysian Danamodal, authorities used stress tests to
determine the amount of capital that banks needed; if they were unable to raise the capital
from private sources, their participation in the official recapitalization became mandatory.
Some jurisdictions made coordinated efforts to minimize the stigma and to ensure wide
participation in programs that they described as voluntary. France’s SPPE coordinated with
the six main French banking groups, then representing 80% of France’s net banking income,
to participate in the capital injection simultaneously (European Commission 2008b; Woll
2014). Similarly, in the US CPP, the Treasury secretary and other high-level government
officials arranged a meeting with the heads of nine of the largest US banks, holding about
55% of all US banking assets at that time. The bankers agreed to participate in CPP “to signal
the program’s importance to the stability of the financial system” (US Government
Accountability Office 2012, 7). The nine banks were selected because government officials
viewed them as systemically important due to their size, scope of business, and
interconnectedness in the broader economy (Office of the Special Inspector General for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program 2009, 14–15). The government believed that having the
institutions all take the capital would mitigate stigmatization by avoiding the appearance
that institutions that took the capital were weak.
Landier and Ueda (2009), however, caution that compulsory programs targeting a set of
banks may require specific changes in the legislation for some jurisdictions, which may not
be feasible when systemic risk is imminent. Nevertheless, ensuring wide participation may
be crucial in the acute phase of a crisis.
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Raising Private Capital
Some BBCI programs required banks to raise private capital before the government capital
assistance came in. For example, Mexico’s PROCAPTE denied participation of a bank that was
unable to raise new capital from the existing shareholders (Mackey 1999, 191). Similarly, for
private bank recapitalization in Colombia in 1999 and 2001, authorities required current
shareholders to contribute.
Indonesia’s BBCI program in 1999 required private banks to raise 20% of the capital
required for the bank to reach a capital adequacy ratio of 4% in cash from the shareholders
before the government provided capital assistance.
In others, the authorities did not require but incentivized the participating banks to raise
private capital first through existing or new shareholders. The UK Bank Recapitalisation
Scheme required institutions that chose to issue ordinary shares to first offer to sell
additional shares to existing shareholders; the government acted as the underwriter of any
of these offers. However, the UK BBCI did not require shareholders to take the offer, unlike
Mexico and Indonesia. The UK government purchased any shares that were not purchased
by existing shareholders at the “maximum permitted discount of 10% to the share price”
(Kroes 2008).
US CAP, similarly, allowed six months after the stress test in 2009 for banks to raise new
capital from private sources. After that, the government acquired new shares to meet any
shortfalls. Crucially, the CAP did not allow banks to meet the Federal Reserve’s capital ratio
target by shrinking their assets (denominator of capital ratio). Instead, the program required
that any shortfall be met by raising new capital (numerator of the ratio). This is an important
mechanism for a chronic phase, preventing a perverse incentive to shrink the balance sheet
by reducing lending.
In Thailand, the government injected Tier 1 capital to meet a capital adequacy ratio of 2.5%.
Beyond this level, the government injected Tier 1 capital only if it was matched by private
capital injections of equal or greater value. This enabled the government to rely on the due
diligence of private investors to determine the level of Tier 1 capital contributions. The
private capital could come from both new and existing shareholders (Lindgren et al. 2000,
100).
Other Efforts to Incentivize Participation
Subsequent policy measures may encourage banks to participate in a voluntary
recapitalization program, if the measure is attractive enough for banks. For example, the US
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) during the Great Depression faced early
hesitancy from banks (Jones 1951, 26). Participation increased when the government
emphasized that only sound and solvent banks would be eligible for the new federal deposit
insurance program that would come into effect at the beginning of 1934 (Banking Act of
1933, 11). By the end of 1933, the RFC had disbursed about USD264 million in preferred
share aid, compared to USD63 million at the end of the third quarter (U. S. Department of the
Treasury 1959, 27).
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9. Individual Participation Limits: Are there any limits to how much assistance an
individual participant can receive from the intervention?
Individual capital injection amounts were often unlimited but, in some cases, tailored to the
size of individual financial institutions. Most commonly, these limits were calculated against
risk-weighted assets. US CPP set forth both a maximum—the lesser of USD25 billion and 3%
of risk-weighted assets—and a minimum of 1% of risk-weighted assets. South Korea’s Bank
Recapitalization Fund (GFC) used asset holdings in calculating individual caps, rejecting the
use of credit ratings because of stigma concerns (Lee and Rhee 2012). Russia’s 2014 program
limited capital injections to no more than 25% of the bank’s capital.
Some programs further tailored the size of capital injections to the needs of individual
institutions. The UK Bank Recapitalisation Scheme depended on calculations using a variety
of bank-specific stress tests, aimed at substantiating private market confidence in the bank
and ensuring enough loss absorption in the case of a recession or tightened banking
conditions.
Similarly, Denmark limited the recapitalization of participating institutions up to a Tier 1
capital ratio of 12%. The Danish National Bank decided on that target after a stress test based
on three scenarios for the 15 largest Danish banks. The central bank concluded the target
12% should increase banks’ ability to get private capital market funding and support the real
economy (European Commission 2009a).
10. Capital Characteristics: What form of capital is injected?
Figure 7 summarizes the main structures used in our 36 cases. Overall, 19 programs used
subordinated debt, 23 used preferred shares, and 11 used common shares. In 22 cases, two
or more types of capital were offered. In 14 cases, preferred shares or subordinated debt
were convertible into common shares. In four cases, Ireland, US CPP and CAP during the GFC
and Thailand during the Asian Financial Crisis, those holdings came with warrants to buy
common shares.
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Figure 7: Capital Characteristics and Phase of Crises
Chronic phase

Acute phase
Programs
Austria FinStaG (GFC)

Capital characteristics*
O (participation capital)

Voting or nonvoting**
NVT

Programs
Colombia FOGAFÍN capital
injection (1999 & 2001)
Denmark Capital Injections
(GFC)
Finland (Nordic Crisis, 1992)

Capital characteristics*
SD, O (loans to shareholders)

Voting or nonvoting**
DK

France SPPE (GFC)

SD, P (later added)

NVT

SD (convertibility added later)

NVT

Germany SoFFin (GFC)

SD (silent participation),
C (later added)
CP

NVT (SD),
VT (C)
DK

CP (government had the right)

NVT

Hungary Bank Recapitalization
(1993–94)
Japan Financial Functions
Stabilization Act (February
1998)
Japan Prompt Recapitalization
Act (August 1998)

C, SD
CP, SD

VT (C),
NVT (SD)
DK

Hong Kong Contingent Bank
Capital Facility (GFC)

DK

DK

Hungary Recapitalization
Scheme (GFC)

P

NVT

MCP, SD

DK

Indonesia Bank
Restructuring Plan of 1999
(Asian Financial Crisis)
Ireland Recapitalization
Program (GFC)
Israel Bank Shares
Arrangement (1983)
Italy Tremonti bonds (GFC)

C, CP (but not used)

VT

Japan Act on Strengthening
Financial Functions (2004-21)

C, CP, SD, O (beneficial rights,
preferred investments)

NVT (unless in three
circumstances)

P

VT (but limited)

SD

DK

O (purchasing
shareholder's shares)
CD

NVT

P, SD

NVT

C, CD

VT

Korea KDIC (Asian
Financial Crisis)
Mexico PROCAPTE 1995
(Peso Crisis)
Poland 1925 FPIK
capitalization (1925)
Russia Bank Capital
Support Program (2014)
Thailand CSF 1998 (Asian
Financial Crisis)
UK Bank Recapitalisation
Scheme (GFC)
US RFC (1933)

C, P, SD

DK

Japan Provision of Subordinated
Loans for Major Banks (GFC)
Korea Bank Recapitalization
Fund (GFC)
Malaysia Danamodal (Asian
Financial Crisis)
Nigeria AMCON (2010)

C, P

DK

CD

DK

Norway (Nordic Crisis, 1991)

VT, NVT

DK

DK

P, SD

NVT

Norway State Finance Fund
(GFC)
Spain FROB (GFC)

C, P, CD, O (primary capital
certificate)
P, O (fund bonds)

VT

P, SD

VT (just for P)

C, P

VT (C), NVT (P)

P, SD

VT

Sweden Bank Support Authority
(1993)
Turkey Saving Deposit
Insurance Fund (2000)
US SCAP and CAP (GFC)

CP, C (later added), CD (later
added)
C, CP (authority had the right to
convert)
O (already SDIF-controlled banks)
MCP

NVT

US CPP (GFC)

P, SD

NVT

US CDCI (GFC)

P, SD

NVT (unless excessive nonrepayment)

Greece (GFC)

DK

*C=common, MCP= mandatorily convertible preferred, CP=convertible preferred, P=preferred, CD=convertible debt, SD=subordinated debt, O=other (specify)
**VT=voting, NVT=nonvoting, DK=do not know

Source: Authors’ analysis.

24

NVT

V, NVT
DK

Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs

Rhee et al.

The wide variety of structures is driven by the variety of goals. Designers use security choice
and shareholder rights to incentivize participation by the “right” institutions, to reduce
moral hazard in participating institutions, to facilitate the eventual exit of government
investment, and sometimes just to get around legal restrictions for existing share classes.
There is no one-size-fits-all path to achieving these goals. Nevertheless, a few patterns
emerge and allow for some general guidance. We discuss some of this guidance below, and
then again in the conclusion section of this paper.
(a) Bearing losses and voting rights can be separated. The label on the security
(common, preferred, debt) does not necessarily imply specific control rights.
Governments of capitalist economies are naturally reluctant to take voting rights in banks.
This reluctance spills over to an avoidance of common share, since common shareholders
typically have voting rights but are last in the cash flow waterfall after debtholders and
preferred shareholders. But while this pairing of voting rights with the willingness to bear
losses is standard, it is absolutely not required. Conversely, preferred share, subordinated
debt, and any other cash flow claim can also be structured to include voting rights. Overall,
there is no reason to let concerns about voting or control have any influence over the cash
flow claims and capital priority embedded in the security choice.
In the US CPP, the authorities pledged not to use the voting power given to them by the
common equity obtained through conversion. In contrast, in the US RFC during the Great
Depression, although assistance was through preferred shares, the authorities required
substantial voting rights. Thailand’s BBCI program also subscribed to preferred shares with
voting rights. Ireland’s BBCI program during the Global Financial Crisis used preferred
shares with 25% of the banks’ voting rights on issues of change of control and board
appointments. In Hungary, the assistance was through nonvoting preferred shares, but the
government received a special veto right as a safeguard.
(b) In an acute phase, simpler is better.
Mariathasan and Merrouche (2012) find that, after analyzing data from public interventions
in 2008–09, common shares, not preferred shares, corresponded to increased bank lending
and larger regulatory capital buffers.
Denmark’s BBCI program during the GFC started with perpetual subordinated debt, but the
authorities later added a convertibility option for participating banks. This was to enhance
the loss-bearing quality of the capital that participating banks issued under the program.
Investors and rating agencies did not consider the initially issued subordinated debt to be
sufficiently loss-bearing, a critical feature for inclusion as core Tier 1 capital.
Indonesia’s BBCI program, which was in an acute phase, favored common shares over
preferred shares and eventually subscribed only to common shares. During the GFC,
Germany and Spain’s BBCI programs exclusively used subordinated debt and preferred
shares, respectively, but when these injections were proven to be insufficient, the authorities
extended the programs to include common shares.
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The Italian government in its BBCI program during the Global Financial Crisis acquired
special bonds known as “Tremonti bonds” from banks. The Tremonti bonds were designed
to qualify as core Tier 1 capital. Interest was noncumulative and only paid if there were
distributable earnings, provided the total capital ratio was at least 8%. They had the same
degree of subordination and same ability to absorb losses as a common share in case of
insolvency or when losses reduced the capital ratio below 8%. A representative from the
Bank of Italy, however, in discussing the features of Tremonti bonds, agreed that, in principle,
instruments with standard, noncomplex features would be preferable for capital injections,
as they would allow for greater comparability, pricing, and clearer loss-absorption
mechanisms.
These examples all point toward using simple structures in the acute phase. In many
countries, the simplest option would be common shares. But it is also possible that preferred
shares could be considered simple enough to execute in the acute phase, especially if banks
already have outstanding preferred shares that they issued in normal times. In the post-GFC
regulatory environment, many countries have adopted preferred shares as part of their
capital buffers. It also may be simpler to issue preferred stock if negotiations with existing
common shareholders about pricing would complicate the issuance of common shares.
(c) In a chronic phase, creative security design can alleviate incentive problems.
Convertible preferred shares warrants with time-varying strike prices and other
features should all be considered but must be tailored to the specific goals of the
program.
As Quintyn and Hoelscher (2003) and Philippon and Schnabl (2013) recommend, other
features attached to the basic forms of capital can enhance the quality of capital. For example,
subordinated debt or preferred shares may not provide a strong enough capital support for
a faltering bank; adding convertibility or warrants can lower the probability of default.
Moreover, the capital base would become even stronger if the exercise of conversion is
mandatory and automatic rather than at the discretion of the holder or the issuer (Landier
and Ueda 2009).
In the Denmark BBCI program, the authorities added a conversion option to the
subordinated debt in the hope of ensuring that participating banks could maximize the use
of capital injections for external-rating purposes while minimizing changes to the authorized
original plan (European Commission 2009a). The conversion option was available for five
years after issuance. By converting, banks could avoid step-up provisions related to interest
rates and reimbursement prices. This gave banks an incentive to convert their debt into
ordinary shares to avoid higher payments (European Commission 2009a). The conversion
price included a 5% discount to the average share price derived over three working days
from the conversion date, limiting the ability of issuers to use the conversion option to
entirely avoid the step-up clauses. For the conversion option, banks had to pay an additional
annual fee of 20 basis points (bps) to 60 bps, as per European Central Bank
recommendations, to align it with the range of remuneration set up for ordinary shares. The
EC verified appropriate fee levels of convertible hybrid capital on a case-by-case basis. The
EC considered these conditions appropriate to safeguard the use of the capital injections
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scheme and to avoid undue distortions of competition, as required by the State Aid policy
(European Commission 2009a).
Convertibility can also be used to direct banks’ behavior. The Irish BBCI incorporated a
conversion exercisable by the government if the participating banks missed dividend
payments. Finland’s 1992 BBCI took the form of noncumulative convertible preferred
shares. The government had the right to convert them to common shares if interest remained
unpaid for three consecutive years or if a bank’s solvency ratio fell below the legal minimum.
The government viewed the three-year target as “enough time for the banks to put their
houses in order” (Kuusterä and Tarkka 2011, 671–74). However, as none of the shares were
converted and the interest rate was set only slightly above the market rate, some argue that
this form of capital support represented a subsidy for the existing shareholders (Moe,
Solheim, and Vale 2004).
There were four interventions with warrants attached in our survey. Warrants gave
authorities the right to purchase shares in the future at a set price, and thus had the political
appeal in allowing the taxpayers to share the potential upside of recipient institutions
(Calomiris and Khan 2015). Philippon and Schnabl (2013) claim preferred shares with
standard warrants outperform common shares in eliminating free-riding and opportunistic
participation. They find that preferred shares with standard warrants minimize ex-post
private information rents to banks and minimize ex-ante moral hazard conditional on any
given likelihood of government intervention. However, in an acute phase of a financial crisis,
using warrants for this purpose may not be the most efficient choice for stabilizing the
financial system quickly. The US CPP and CAP had 10-year warrants, which were
immediately exercisable, attached to the preferred shares. This allowed the government to
purchase common shares of publicly traded banks equal to a certain percentage of preferred
shares issued on the day of the initial investment.
In Ireland, the preferred shares came with warrants giving the government the right to
purchase 25% of the common shares of each bank after five years. The strike prices for these
warrants were in each bank’s case less than 1 euro. A bank could reduce the government’s
rights under the warrant to as low as 15% of the common shares if the bank redeemed the
preferred shares up to EUR1.5 billion by the end of 2009. This tranche of warrants that the
banks could eliminate had a materially lower strike price than the rest of the warrants,
aiming to encourage banks to expediently replace government capital with new private
capital (European Commission 2009d, 7; European Commission 2009e, 7). The government
could not vote more than half of the votes associated with any shares it received through
exercise of the warrant, but if these shares were transferred to a nongovernment third party,
full voting privileges became reinstated (Department of Finance 2009). US CPP had a similar
voting restriction on common shares acquired by the exercise of warrants.
Some cases used forms of capital that diverge further from these standard forms. In Austria,
the form of capital issued under the BBCI program was participation capital, largely shaped
by banks. This was introduced in Austria 30 years before the crisis and does not grant the
government any position or membership rights under stock corporation law, giving the
government no direct influence over the beneficiary institution. According to Kalss (2010),
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the preference for participation capital stemmed from the banks’ influence on the writing of
the Financial Market Stability Act, which the recapitalization relied upon, and their input
during individual negotiations for institutional recapitalization.
(d) Be careful about corporate charters and existing shareholder/creditor rights.
For issuance of new shares and the conversion to and exercise of warrants for common
shares to operate smoothly and timely, authorities need to ensure certain requirements are
met for banks to have enough available authorized shares. In Indonesia, the authorities faced
delays due to its capital regulation, requiring a preemptive rights issue for new issuance of
shares to protect existing shareholders. Spain’s BBCI program during the Global Financial
Crisis and beyond required participating banks to cancel preemptive subscription rights of
existing shareholders. In the US CAP and CPP, the authorities recommended and incentivized
the banks to go through the process of increasing the number of authorized shares earlier
than later in preparation for a smooth convertibility when the warrants were exercised.
In the US CAP, to incentivize banks to solve shareholder rights issues in a timely fashion, the
strike price on the warrants was reduced by 15% every six months if banks did not obtain
preemptive shareholder consent to increase the number of authorized shares.
11. Interest Rates and Dividends (Pricing): Should they be uniform or risk adjusted?
Generous or punitive?
Authorities have two main decisions to make in pricing BBCI programs. First, will the rates
be uniform for all participants or calibrated to the riskiness or size of each bank? Second, will
the rates be relatively generous to incentivize participation or relatively high to encourage
banks to find funding elsewhere? The goal of a BBCI program will largely shape the decisions.
For example, if the crisis is in an acute phase and the goal is to intervene fast to stem panic,
the pricing structure may be uniform and more generous. On the other hand, if the crisis has
calmed and entered a chronic phase, in which the main goal is to stimulate bank lending,
then the pricing structure may be more tailored and less generous.
Uniform or Risk Adjusted?
Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the UK, and the US imposed a flat, uniform rate for all
participating financial institutions.
In other cases, dividend and interest rates varied depending on the riskiness of the
investment. For example, in France, the interest rate for subordinated debt was cheaper than
for preferred shares, reflecting a greater degree of subordination and risk for the authorities.
In Japan (1998), Austria (GFC), and Denmark (GFC), interest rates and dividends varied
depending on the health of the bank. In South Korea’s 2008 BBCI program, national banks
had lower interest rates than regional banks.
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Generous or Punitive?
Interest rates and dividend rates were often set above market rates. Finland had a variable
interest rate set slightly above market rate.
Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US adopted step-up clauses after a set number
of years had passed from issuance to incentivize banks to repay and exit the program as soon
as market conditions improved. In the Japanese program during the GFC, the interest rate
was determined through auction. Under the Provision of Subordinated Loans for Major
Japanese Banks in the global financial crisis, BOJ allowed for the amount of each loan and
interest rates for the first five years on the 10-year and perpetual loans to be determined at
auctions using a premium over the six-month yen LIBOR. The interest rate rose by 1.5% after
five years to penalize banks that did not exit. The US CPP required preferred shares to pay a
5% annual dividend for the first five years—as an incentive to participate in the voluntary
program—and a flat 9% after, as an incentive to exit.
A country may attract some criticism if it sets a more punitive dividend rate compared to
BBCI programs that other countries establish at the same time, especially if both
jurisdictions share the same financial institutions and similar financial markets. In the UK
Bank Recapitalisation Scheme, ordinary shares were issued at a discount to the reference
market price, while preferred shares paid a 12% annual dividend for the first five years and
three-month Libor plus 700 bps thereafter. The high cost to banks in a program that was
entirely voluntary ensured that the UK program carried a stigma (Culpepper and Reinke
2014). Culpepper and Reinke (2014) argue that the high costs attached to recapitalization
were more of a drawback to participation, rather than beneficial to taxpayers.
Going into the Global Financial Crisis, the European Commission’s State Aid rules followed
the principle that recapitalizations should minimize the amount of State Aid. Such a principle
would suggest charging relatively high interest and dividend payments in BBCI programs.
Nonetheless, the EC recognized that high rates would discourage banks from participating
in recapitalizations. The EC intended to adjust to long-term market conditions and not to
impose unfavorable conditions at the time of the crisis. For these reasons, the EC approved
dividend rates reflecting market-based remuneration between 6% and 9.3%, according to
the degree of subordination. Individual member states had room to adjust the EC guideline
for two reasons: (1) to incentivize early repayment, so as to reduce taxpayers’ exposure; and
(2) to avoid excessive recourse to the program, without being excessively penalizing
(Panetta et al. 2009).
In Italy, authorities revised the interest rate and the redemption price to encourage
participation by sound banks. The initial option consisted of lower coupon payments and
higher redemption prices for five years; later, the authorities added the option of a higher
initial coupon and lower redemption price. EC Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said
that “[t]he Italian authorities have asked permission to modify the design of their scheme to
make it more attractive to sound banks that are willing to use the state capital only for a very
short period of time” (European Commission 2009c). However, this feature—emphasizing
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the usage for only a short period of time—may no longer allow this form of capital to qualify
as Tier 1 under the new regulatory framework applied to all EU member countries in 2014.
12. Allocation of losses for existing stakeholders: Were there any write-downs of the
value for existing equity?
Several BBCI programs require banks to write down the value of nonperforming or
depreciated assets before the government will buy shares, forcing existing shareholders to
bear losses first. This is typically a feature of a capital injection that is mandatory, rather than
voluntary.
South Korea’s 1997 BBCI program—which was mandatory, and during the acute phase of a
crisis—enabled the authorities to order capital write-downs for existing shareholders.
Colombia’s BBCI program required participating banks to write off their nonperforming
loans in such a way that it reasonably reflected their true economic value. If after the writeoffs, the bank’s equity was negative, its shareholders had to capitalize the institution with
their own resources to bring equity to at least zero.
Similarly, in Malaysia—which was mandatory for banks that were unable to raise funds from
private investors—existing shareholders bore all losses prior to recapitalization under the
“first-loss” principle. In practice, the application of this principle required banks to mark
down the value of investments and sell their NPLs to the asset management authorities. This
resulted in “equitable burden sharing” for existing shareholders and reduced the use of
public funds (Bank Negara Malaysia 1999, 20). The central bank argued that strict
observance to the “first-loss” principle successfully minimized the total cost of
recapitalization (Bank Negara Malaysia 2004, 108).
Norway’s BBCI program in 1991 required banks to write down the equity value, forcing
existing shareholders to absorb losses before the government made direct capital
investments in the banks. If a bank refused to do so, the government was entitled to write
down its share capital. There is some disagreement as to whether this strategy was helpful,
with Bergo (2003) highlighting the valuable political benefits of imposing losses on current
shareholders, and Moe, Solheim, and Vale (2004) claiming that the specific write-down
decisions seemed arbitrary for some banks and thus reduced confidence in the program.
In Thailand’s 1998 program, banks receiving Tier 1 capital were required to write down the
equity value, forcing losses on existing shareholders, and to allow the government to change
management and boards of directors. These relatively punitive terms have split opinion in
the typical fashion. Some commentators argue that such punitive terms in a voluntary
program reduced participation and delayed the recapitalization of the sector (World Bank
2000). Others applaud the incentives created to raise capital privately so as to avoid the
punitive terms (Scott 2002). This trade-off will always exist, and future designers should not
expect that they will get only one side of it.
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13. Business Restructuring Plan: Were there any requirements on restructuring
business for the participating institutions?
Many BBCI programs require participating institutions to submit business restructuring
plans with the authorities. Used as a condition of any capital injection, the requirement of
such plans can ease the path toward long-term viability and carries the political benefit of
putting conditions on the recipients of support. The potential downside is that governments
generally do not have the expertise to properly vet these plans, and they run the risk of
making things worse. As usual, the details vary, and designers should at least know the menu
of options.
For example, EC’s guidance on recapitalizing banks during the Global Financial Crisis
required member states to submit business-restructuring plans for financial institutions
unable to exit the BBCI program after six months. The deadline could be extended in sixmonth increments if the crisis were to continue (European Commission 2008a). The
restructuring plan included disclosure of impaired assets, structural changes, and burdensharing with the government (European Commission 2009f). On the other hand, US BBCI
programs during the Global Financial Crisis did not require such agreements with
participating financial institutions.
Most BBCI programs in Asian countries responding to the financial crisis in 1997–99 also
required banks to submit and implement plans. For example, Indonesian banks seeking
recapitalization submitted three-year business plans addressing items including: (1) the
current condition of the bank and weaknesses needing attention; (2) steps and schedule for
resolution of problem loans and nonperforming property loans; (3) the bank’s strategy to
improve performance and health, both short and long term; and (4) plans to repay the
capital. In South Korea, the plans included details on a financial institution’s target capital
adequacy ratio, profit-to-assets ratio, bad-loan ratio, and the written consent of the in-house
labor union to restructuring. Often, these plans also included a consideration for merger, as
seen in Indonesia and Malaysia.
An exception was Japan’s BBCI under the FFSA in 1998. The FFSA did not mandate any
examination or cleanup of bank balance sheets. Banks were, therefore, able to receive capital
from the government without writing off any of their bad debts. Banks continued to
improperly value their NPLs. This contributed to further undercapitalization and made it
difficult for the government to accurately estimate how much capital was needed to properly
recapitalize the banks (Fukao 2000). Thus, the following BBCI program seeking to improve
upon the FFSA BBCI encouraged restructuring, corporate reorganization, and cost reduction
by the participating banks.
In Hungary, as a precondition to its 1993–94 recapitalization, banks submitted
“consolidation plans,” which were medium-term restructuring plans. The consolidation plan
involved management strategies for their reorganization and to participate actively in
enterprise debt resolution programs. This agreement also prescribed certain restructuring
procedures on an individual basis.
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14. Fate of Existing Board and Management: Did the authorities have the right to
replace any board members or management of participating institutions?
Replacing existing boards and management has similar benefits and costs as requirements
of business restructuring discussed in the previous section. In a few cases, especially during
the Nordic Crisis and the Asian Financial Crisis, voluntary recapitalization programs gave the
authorities power to replace bank management. In other BBCI programs, the authorities
could replace bank management if banks failed to achieve certain performance targets.
In Norway’s 1991 BBCI, authorities could replace bank management (Moe, Solheim, and Vale
2004). Although the members of the banks' governing bodies were replaced, the governance
structure of the banks was maintained. This prevented the recapitalization authority from
interfering with the banks’ day-to-day business operations (Bergo 2003). Sweden’s 1993
BBCI and Nigeria’s AMCON also actively replaced management of troubled banks.
In Malaysia, the authorities appointed a minimum of two nominees to serve as executive
director and either chairman or deputy chairman on the board of directors of beneficiary
institutions. The amount of Tier 1 capital injected dictated additional board representation
beyond the minimum two appointees. Reviewing the Malaysian program, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) cautioned that replacing a couple of directors and chief executives may
not be sufficient; ineffective management teams may remain, with the potential for similar
problems arising in the future (International Monetary Fund 1999).
In Thailand, on the other hand, the government’s right to appoint board members if banks
issued Tier 1 capital under the BBCI, in combination with write-down requirements for
existing shareholders, made banks wary of the Tier 1 capital injection program (World Bank
2000, 33). Eventually, only banks already with large government holdings requested and
received Tier 1 capital (Warr 2004, 74).
Some authorities chose not to or neglected to exercise the right to replace existing boards
and management. Germany’s SoFFin, during the Global Financial Crisis, had the right to
replace three board seats in a bank but did not exercise that right, since it did not intend to
influence the bank’s decision-making or interfere with the ownership control of existing
private shareholders.
All three US BBCI programs in the GFC allowed the government to appoint two directors if a
bank missed too many interest or dividend payments. In the case of the CDCI, the inspector
general criticized the government for failing to act consistently on its own right to attend
board meetings and appoint directors in the event of consecutive missed interest or dividend
payments (Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program
2014, 13). For example, a CDCI recipient had missed 12 dividend payments, yet the
government failed to place any representatives on the company’s board (Office of the Special
Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program 2014, 14). On the other hand, when
another recipient missed enough payments to warrant a government observer at its board
meetings, the recipient rejected the observer but subsequently paid the back dividends. This
suggested that enforcing management rights may lead to better compliance and less cost for
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the government (Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program 2017, 57–58).
15. Other Conditions: Should recapitalization come with nonprice conditions to
incentivize banks to exit government support quickly?
On balance, the picture is murky for an acute phase. But once a crisis has reached a chronic
phase, the balance would appear to favor conditions.
Authorities have used several other nonprice conditions to incentivize banks to exit from the
government support as soon as market conditions recovered. These conditions can also help
build political support for recapitalization programs. Restrictions on executive
compensation and dividend payments were the most widely adopted in our survey.
Requirements to maintain adequate lending to businesses and households were also
widespread (Panetta et al. 2009). Other examples include limiting or prohibiting share
buybacks and subordinating existing shareholders to shares issued under BBCI programs.
Sweden’s Bank Support Authority imposed profit-sharing arrangements so that taxpayers
could take advantage of the upside of the BBCI program.
These conditions, however, can come with some downsides. For US CPP, Calomiris and Khan
(2015) point out that executive compensation restrictions were associated with less
willingness on the part of banks to participate in the program.
Conditions requiring participating banks to increase or maintain lending to individuals and
small businesses or certain core industry sectors are politically tempting but carry risks. A
relatively benign implementation requires only a plan and some reporting. For example, the
US CAP (GFC) required participating banks to submit a plan for how they intended to use the
capital to increase lending activities above levels that would have been possible without
government support. It also required banks to submit regular reports on their lending by
category and to compare that lending to estimates of what lending would have been without
government support.
However, political pressure to leverage the state’s ownership in a bank to promote lending
to a particular sector can interfere with a bank’s financial recovery and increase the odds the
bank will require further support in the future. For example, an IMF report cautioned in the
case of Malaysia that too much emphasis on loan growth by the central bank and the
interventions aimed at sparking growth had the potential to generate poor quality loans
(International Monetary Fund 1999, 72). Similarly, in a more recent Russian BBCI program,
the IMF urged the authorities to eliminate the monthly 1% credit-growth targets to selected
sectors since forced lending could increase credit risks for banks and result in potential
inefficient credit allocation. The IMF recommends that lending targets should instead be
based on banks’ commercial assessment of risk and remuneration.
Many BBCI programs subordinated payments to and imposed dividend restrictions on
existing shareholders to further protect the government investment. For example, Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan (in the GFC), Mexico, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, the UK,
and the US included dividend restrictions. At some level, such a restriction seems self-
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evident: if the government is injecting capital, then it would work directly against their goals
for that capital to be immediately paid out to shareholders. In addition to the direct reduction
in capital, allowing dividend payments carries political risk. The main argument against such
a restriction is that it could serve to stigmatize program recipients.
In the US CPP (GFC), when the government subscribed to preferred shares, recipient banks
were required to be current on all dividends to the government before they could pay any
dividends on common shares and other junior or equivalently ranked shares. Such
subordination is typical for preferred shares. However, there were no other restrictions on
paying dividends to common shareholders. The participating financial institutions could
even increase the amount of common share dividends with government approval. After the
third anniversary of the capital injection, publicly traded participating financial institutions
could raise common share dividends by any amount without government approval. After 10
years, all participating institutions could raise common share dividends by any amount
without approval. A subsequent study by Calomiris and Khan (2015) argues that common
share dividends should have been completely restricted despite the government’s assertions
that, had they done so, the largest banks, such as JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup, might not
have participated in the program. Given the acute phase of the crisis when the policy was
announced, we reserve judgement on this debate.
16. Exit Strategy: Did the authorities have a plan to unload its investments once
conditions normalized? Was the plan in place at the time of capital injection?
Most governments do not want to be long-term investors in their banks. But exiting from
crisis era investments can be difficult, especially when the banks are not publicly traded, or
if the government’s holdings are not in common equity. Since exit can be difficult, it is helpful
to have a plan already in place at the start. Just having a sunset date for investments is not
sufficient—it is still necessary to sell or otherwise liquidate all of the earlier investments.
The most common exit is a redemption arrangement, in which the bank agrees to buy back
shares or pay back loans. These arrangements often include a premium, if the capital
outstanding is not bought back by the participating bank within a certain period. Conversely,
redemptions before a certain period can also have some restrictions. For example, the US
CPP allowed redemption after three years, and early redemption was allowed only with the
proceeds from the new issuance of Tier 1 qualifying perpetual preferred shares or common
shares. Other strategies include the government selling its shares in participating banks to a
private investor, sometimes holding an auction.
Other price-related conditions discussed above on convertibility, warrants, and step-up
clauses for interest or dividend rates also incentivize the exit of the participating banks as
soon as viable. Concurrent policy interventions such as restructuring, resolution, and asset
purchases also assist in the government exiting from BBCI programs.
The IMF tends to criticize governments that lacked exit strategies. An IMF note on Germany’s
SoFFin emphasized that, to return to a functioning financial sector, concrete exit strategies
for banks remaining in the capital injection program were essential, including ways to wind
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up institutions. It recommended conversion of government capital into common shares, with
a view to selling these shares to the private sector when market circumstances permitted.
Furthermore, it recommended that these strategic plans should aim at reducing the possible
future need for such assistance, in part by raising private capital or by adjusting banks’
balance sheets (International Monetary Fund 2011).
Similarly, the IMF criticized Nigeria’s AMCON for lack of explicit exit strategy. Again, it voiced
concerns regarding the absence of a sunset provision for AMCON’s activities. In a 2012
report, the IMF recommended that a “credible exit strategy [should be] devised to ensure a
smooth winding up of its operations by end-2017” (International Monetary Fund 2013, 12).
The IMF emphasized that an explicit sunset date is “important to minimize fiscal risks and
avoid potential moral hazard behavior by the banks” (International Monetary Fund 2013,
12). However, AMCON failed to implement an exit strategy, and the IMF reiterated its
criticism in a 2019 report (International Monetary Fund 2019).
17. Amendments to Relevant Regulations: Did the authorities amend any existing
regulations that acted as a hurdle to participation in the capital injection? Were
there any amendments to regulation allowing easier access to foreign capital?
Was there tightening of capital requirements? Did the authorities introduce a new
resolution framework?
In some cases, existing regulations must be amended to allow eligible institutions to
participate in BBCI programs or to help the programs run smoothly. During the Nordic Crisis,
both Norway and Sweden had to amend laws to allow the government to write down the
value of existing bank shares without shareholder approval. For example, in Norway, when
the government first attempted to recapitalize a bank by writing down its share value to
zero, it faced legal objections from shareholders. The case was brought to court; the court
agreed with the government’s view that the bank was insolvent, but to avoid similar
occurrences in future recapitalizations, the legislature passed a new law allowing the
government's discretion in writing down share value of the participating banks.
The US RFC could initially subscribe to cumulative nonassessable preferred stock. But the
laws in most states prevented state-chartered banks and trust companies from issuing
preferred stock. Congress amended the law to clarify that, in those states, the RFC was
authorized to purchase capital notes or debentures of state banks or trust companies in place
of preferred shares.
In France, the central bank increased the ceiling of non-core Tier 1 capital to 35% after some
banks already reached the previous limit of 25% through participation in the BBCI program.
This allowed banks to take full advantage of the capital injections provided by the program
(Conac 2010).
Some governments have changed the rules to broaden the pool of private capital available
for banks. The Mexican Congress modified bank ownership laws to permit foreign financial
institutions to take control of troubled domestic banks. This quickly opened Mexico’s
banking system to foreign participation (Lubrano 1998, 11). With the PROCAPTE
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recapitalization, foreigners invested a significant amount of capital in Mexican banks.
Foreign-controlled banks came to account for 20% of the entire Mexican banking system’s
assets; adding in the noncontrolling shares, that stake reached 30%. Foreign banks obtaining
controlling and noncontrolling shares included Spanish, Canadian, US, and Hong Kong banks
(Lubrano 1998). Similarly, in Thailand, to incentivize the entry of foreign capital, the
government loosened restrictions on foreign ownership of Thai financial institutions in 1997
(Santiprabhob 2003, 26–28). The Emergency Decree Amending the Commercial Banking Act
lifted the 25% ceiling on foreign ownership on a case-by-case basis and allowed 100%
foreign ownership by foreign investors that aimed to resolve or rehabilitate distressed
financial institutions (Bank of Thailand 2000, 12).
Some governments did not amend regulations, hindering their BBCI programs. As discussed
above, in obtaining shareholder approval for issuance of new shares, the Indonesian capital
markets regulation required banks to offer shareholders preemptive rights issues before
they could issue new shares. The process for rights issues was lengthy, causing delays in
recapitalization. While the Financial Services Authority (FSA) attempted to resolve this
problem by allowing direct public offerings, it was faced with protests because the offerings
did not protect minority shareholders. The delay persisted (Enoch, Garcia, and Sundararajan
2001, 55).
Other governments tightened regulatory requirements to meet international standards
before banks were able to secure sufficient capital. This made it difficult for banks to recover.
To prevent banks from having future problems, the Thai government raised supervisory
standards, and new regulatory standards required banks and nonbank financial institutions
to significantly increase their capital (Vichyanond 2004, 217). The Bank of Thailand also
raised loan classification, provisioning, and reporting standards to bring Thai financial
institutions in line with international standards by end-2000 (Vichyanond 2004, 217). By
the time that the BBCI program opened in late 1998, these regulatory changes were already
in place. Although the Thai government allowed a transitional period phasing in the changed
standards, to receive Tier 1 capital injections, institutions were required to make full end2000 provisions immediately and to forgo the transitional period (Bank for International
Settlements 1999, 43; Nimmanahaeminda and Sonakul 1998). These financial institutions,
however, were already struggling because the new regulatory standards forced substantial
write-downs on their capital, thus making it even harder for these institutions to become
eligible for a capital injection (MacDonald 1998, 3–4; World Bank 2000, 33).
In some countries, the government seizes the opportunity to establish a permanent legal
framework for restructuring banks based on the experience with recapitalization in a crisis.
In implementing policy interventions during financial crises, it is recommended to use the
crisis as an opportunity to implement medium-term structural reforms, including improving
the general quality of institutions, combating corruption, and building a more efficient
judicial system.
These reforms are positively associated with faster recovery. These measures of institutional
development are also important determinants of the fiscal outlays (Klingebiel, Claessens,
and Laeven 2004). Germany passed an act allowing authorities to forcibly assume control of
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or nationalize ailing financial institutions in early 2009, quickly enabling the authorities to
overcome resistance from existing shareholders and ease the process of intervening in
troubled institutions whose failure may trigger a systemic crisis. France, on the other hand,
did not; some criticize the authorities for failing to leverage the opportunity to pass a similar
law (Conac 2010). Other nations, such as Colombia and Hungary, introduced prudential
regulation of banks for the first time.

Conclusion
This paper surveys 17 Key Design Decisions for 36 cases of BBCI programs. These examples
do not allow traditional empirical analysis. Nevertheless, we believe that several themes
emerge from a close study of these cases. Below, we list and discuss seven of those themes.
The most common mistake is for programs to be too small. We see this pattern in the
case studies, and it is reinforced by the empirical literature (Brei, Gambacorta, and von Peter
(2013); Giannetti and Simonov (2013); Poczter (2016)). And the discussion of Key Design
Decision No. 5, Size, lists several examples where programs were too small, delaying or
preventing any positive effects.
Combining BBCIs with other interventions is good practice. BBCIs are politically
challenging to do, and it is critical for the program to be of sufficient size. As such, political
constraints may prevent a program from being large enough at the beginning, and from
getting an opportunity to adjust upward later. Combining other programs with BBCI can be
a useful force multiplier. As discussed above in Key Design Decision No. 1, Part of a Package,
debt and/or account guarantee programs have been a popular combination with BBCIs,
appearing in 22 out of the 36 cases studied. Regarding the most well-studied example—the
US CPP—several experts believe the combination with a debt guarantee program was pivotal
to the success of the BBCI.
Beware of legal/regulatory constraints on program implementation. BBCI programs
frequently require participating banks to increase their authorized shares, eliminate an
existing form of shareholder or debtor rights, or get an exemption from some other
regulatory rule. These constraints are often far from the top of policymakers’ concerns but
ignoring them can lead an otherwise well-designed program into unnecessary delays. Key
Design Decisions No. 6, Timing, and No. 17, Amendments to Relevant Regulations, discuss
some examples. In an ideal world, policymakers would address as many of these problems
as possible through legislation passed in quiet times, allowing for emergency authority to be
utilized efficiently.
Triage of banks, through stress tests or other means, is good practice in a chronic phase but
may not be desirable (or even feasible) in an acute phase. Designers want to get the right
amount of capital into each bank and are understandably wary about sending any capital to
unviable enterprises. During a chronic phase of a crisis, when run risk is low, a well-designed
triage system can greatly mitigate these concerns. The case studies include several examples
of such triage that have received positive postmortem reviews. But the case studies also
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show examples of well-intentioned triage that came too early in a crisis, slowing down the
intervention and failing to provide any clarity for bank counterparties. Key Design Decision
No. 8, Eligible Institutions, gives some examples. As noted, better data and frequent stresstesting since the GFC make it possible that some countries could now conduct a credible
triage even in the acute phase of a crisis.
Make sure that the exit plan fits the investment type. It is all well and good to get the
capital into the banks, but how will you get it out? As discussed in Key Design Decision No.
10, Capital Characteristics, some BBCIs use security-design features to accomplish this goal,
with time-varying incentives for banks to replace the injections with private capital. The
ability to employ such clever design will vary by jurisdiction and by institutional form. A
good designer will be aware of the options. Several others are discussed in Key Design
Decision No. 16, Exit Strategy.
Security design can separate voting rights from the willingness to bear losses. There
are many cases where designers avoid common share investments because of a desire to
avoid government “control” over banks. But there is no reason to constrain security choice
for this reason. It is possible to have the loss absorption of common shares without any
voting control at all. Conversely, if designers want to be higher in the capital structure but
also desire some control, that can be accomplished through contractual terms unattached to
the typical voting rights of the security. The typical linkage of voting rights and lossabsorption is frequently cited as a constraint, but it should not be. Key Design Decisions No.
10, Capital Characteristics, gives several examples where these concepts were successfully
separated.
In the acute phase, simpler is better. This theme applies across many design features: in
the acute phase, designers are trying to communicate with bank counterparties. For many of
these counterparties, the rational response to complexity is to “run.” Complex program
design is often motivated by a natural desire to minimize moral hazard and protect
taxpayers. In a chronic phase, those laudable goals can come to the forefront. But in an acute
phase, simple capital structures and nonpunitive conditions have the best chance of
attracting participation and preventing runs.

38

Broad-Based Capital Injection Programs

Rhee et al.

Glossary
AMCON: Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (Nigeria)
BBCI: Broad-based capital injection
BRSA: Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority (Turkey)
BSA: Bank Support Authority (Sweden)
CAP: Capital Assistance Program (US)
CAR: Capital adequacy ratio
CDCI: Community Development Capital Initiative (US)
CDFI: Community Development Financial Institution (US)
CDS: Credit default swap
CoE: Certificate of Entitlement (Indonesia and others)
COP: Congressional Oversight Panel (US)
CPP: Capital Purchase Program (US)
CSF: Capital Support Facilities (Thailand)
DIA: Deposit Insurance Agency (Russia)
EBA: European Banking Authority (EBA)
EC: European Commission (Europe)
EESA: European Economic Stabilization Act (Europe)
EU: European Union (Europe)
FDIC: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (US)
FFSA: Financial Functions Stabilization Act (Japan)
FIMBAG: Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des Bundes (Austria)
FinStaG: Financial Market Stability Act (Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz) (Austria)
FOBAPROA: Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro (Mexico)
FOGAFÍN: Financial Institutions Guarantee Fund (Colombia)
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FPIK: Fundusz Pomocy Instytucjom Kredytowym (Poland)
FRC: Financial Reconstruction Commission (Japan)
FROB: Fondo de Reestructuración Ordenada Bancaria (Spain)
FSA: Financial Services Authority (Indonesia)
GAO: Government Accountability Office (US)
GBIF: Government Bank Insurance Fund (Norway)
GDP: Gross domestic product
IBRA: Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (Indonesia)
IMF: International Monetary Fund
KDIC: Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (Korea)
Libor: London Interbank Offered Rate
NPL: Nonperforming loans
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PROCAPTE: Programa de Capitalización Temporal (Mexico)
RCC: Resolution and Collection Corporation (Japan)
RFC: Reconstruction Finance Corporation (US)
RWA: Risk-weighted assets
SBIF: New and additional GBIF (Norway)
SCAP: Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (US)
SDIF: Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Turkey)
SFF: State Finance Fund (Norway)
SoFFin: Sonderfonds Finanzmarktstabilisierung (Germany)
SPPE: Société de prise de participation de l’État (France)
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Europe)
UKFI: UK Financial Investments (UK)
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